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 Our beliefs profoundly influence how we interact and understand the experiences 
we have and the world around us. However, some individuals may develop “false” 
beliefs (i.e., delusions) that are not grounded in consensual reality that may create 
adversities for the individual or others. Although various theories have been developed 
relating to the formation and maintenance of delusions, explaining their origins, 
meanings, and precise influence is a difficult task due to the highly individualistic nature 
of beliefs. The current study examined a number of likely candidate processes suspected 
of contributing to the formation and maintenance of delusional ideation in a sub-clinical 
sample of 200 undergraduate students. Overall, mixed support for our hypotheses were 
found. As expected, sub-clinical schizophrenia-spectrum symptomology were highly 
correlated.  Additionally, delusional ideation was predicted by cognitive and mood facets, 
and normative beliefs such as spirituality. Expansive delusions in particular were 
predictive of self-esteem, sense of purpose, and approaching significance with positive 
affect, highlighting potential positive influences of delusional ideation. Certain elements 
of cognitive processes, symptomology, emotional, and contextual factors may interact 
with an individual’s self-view, which in turn may influence the content of specific types 
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Our beliefs fundamentally shape how we view our daily experiences; these 
perceptions influence how we behave and the life choices we make. Theorists have 
attempted to define and explain how false beliefs that significantly deviate from shared 
consensus (i.e., delusions) are formed and maintained. Early theories have consistently 
linked the notion of delusions to that of madness or mental disorders (Jaspers, 1968), 
though explaining its origins and meaning proved to be a difficult task. Many 
contemporary models of delusion formation stem from the pioneering work of Karl 
Jaspers harkening back to the early 1900s. Jaspers states there are three main criteria that 
explain the presence of delusions: 1) staunch conviction that the belief is true, 2) not 
yielding to contrary evidence that may discredit the belief and 3) the factual 
implausibility of the belief (Jaspers, 1968). Jaspers used the term delusion-like ideas to 
denote delusional beliefs that are derived from the individual’s background and 
familial/cultural experiences, whereas delusion-proper did not have this basis (Jaspers, 
1968).  
Modern theories influenced by Jaspers’ work tend to reference the notion of 
anomalous experiences contributing to the formation of delusional beliefs. Roberts (1991, 
1992) suggests that based on previous research there are three phases that contribute to 
the formation and maintenance of delusional beliefs. The first phase is a state of pre-
psychosis. Within this phase, there are stages of predisposing (innate, biological) and 
precipitating factors (life events, experiences) that exist. The second phase is called the 
acute phase and involves a prodromal stage of an anomalous experience. The individual 
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attempts to put meaning onto and explain this experience. Most often this is a non-
complex delusion and perhaps might be novel to the individual. If the individual suggests 
a meaning that is not in line with the experience or their own background delusions-
proper, or primary delusions are formed. Phase three is the chronic phase in which the 
individual elaborates and expands their delusional belief to similar, new, or existing 
experiences (Roberts, 1991, 1992). Maher (1992) adds that individuals seek to put 
meaning to anomalous experiences in order to relieve any tension that might arise from 
the unknown-like quality and confusion of such experiences. Many beliefs, whether 
delusional or “normal” (fitting with the surrounding culture and society) involve an 
attribution of meaning or explanation to experiences (Maher, 1992). However, the 
contributing factors to the formation and maintenance of beliefs are highly individualized 
and can vary greatly from person to person (Roberts, 1992).  
Importantly, Jaspers (1968), Maher (1992), and Roberts (1991, 1992), have all 
noted that delusions might form in order to provide a sense of meaning, explanation, or 
purpose to the individual. In fact, the concepts of Maher and Roberts include this notion 
as a central point. Once meaning is applied to an experience, many individuals report a 
diminishment in the internal distress that was related to their uncertainty. In this sense, 
certain delusions might provide the means for an individual to cope with their 
surrounding experiences and perhaps even aid in explaining and putting meaning to 
certain physical and mental symptoms that they might be experiencing. On the other side, 
studies have found that the presence of delusions can also be associated with levels of 
depression and anxiety (Colbert, Peters, & Garety, 2010) and can further alienate 
individuals from social supports (Saha, Scott, Varghese, & McGrath, 2012; Ertugrul, & 
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Uluğ, 2004) or lead to potentially dangerous behaviors (Joseph, Victor, & Rimona, 2011; 
Onwumere, Learmonth, & Kuipers, 2016). Thus, the adaptive (or meaning-creating) 
nature of delusional beliefs and the potential harm to the individual and society are two 
sides of the same coin that must be considered when working clinically with individuals 
who have formed delusional beliefs. Treatment plans that take into account this duality 
have a much greater likelihood of being effective.   
With this in mind, basic research on belief-formation and belief-maintenance in 
subclinical populations is quite rare. This is unfortunate since this form of research has 
the potential to aid in the prediction of future clinical diagnoses and symptomology 
(Verdoux & van Os, 2002). More information is needed regarding the factors that 
influence how an individual perceives, interprets, and copes with the circumstances that 
surround them. The development of delusional beliefs can occur across a range of 
physical health and mental health diagnoses (Maher 1992). In particular, delusional 
beliefs and ideation are listed among the possible criteria for all the schizophrenia-
spectrum disorders listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5; American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). The DSM-5 is used by mental health professionals in 
North America to formally diagnose mental disorders. Thus, delusions or delusion-like 
beliefs are viewed as being a central feature of the primary psychotic disorders that range 
from the sub-clinical symptoms of schizotypy (Debbané, Van der Linden, Gex-Fabry & 
Eliez, 2009) to cluster A personality disorders (e.g., schizotypal personality disorder) 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013), through the various clinical manifestations of 
the schizophrenia-spectrum disorders (Barrantes-Vidal, Chun, Myin-Germeys & Kwapil, 
2013; Debbané, Van der Linden, Balanzin, Billieux & Eliez, 2012; Nunn, Rizza & Peters, 
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2001; Smith, Riley & Peters, 2009; Verdoux & van Os, 2002). The concepts of 
multifinality (i.e., similar pathways to multiple symptomology outcome presentations) 
and equifinality (i.e., multiple pathways to a single or similar symptomology outcome 
presentation) apply to the development of delusional beliefs since the exact factors are 
not necessarily consistent and present across all those that experience delusions (Cicchetti 
& Rogosch, 1996). Thus, studying a multitude of potential factors is needed to illuminate 
the “common” and idiopathic mechanisms behind the formation and maintenance of 
delusional beliefs. In fact, Roberts (1992) stated that there is a need to attempt to develop 
an intricate and multifaceted approach to understanding delusions across disciplines.  
Thus, prior to articulating the purpose of the present study, some basic background on 
potential factors that can be involved in belief (normative and abnormal) formation and 
















Potential Factors Involved in Belief Formation and Maintenance 
 There are several likely candidates that may be involved in belief formation and 
maintenance. These may include elements of symptomology, cognitive processes, and the 
influence of society. We have organized the following review based on the major themes 
present within the literature. 
Anxiety, uncertainty, and meaning. Maher (1992) states that an odd experience 
(i.e., one that cannot be accounted for based on previous understandings) can generate the 
need for an individual to explicitly construct new explanations, or rationalizations for the 
experience in order to avoid the angst associated with the unknown, which may be 
experienced as threatening or confusing. Thus, in the context of Robert’s (1991, 1992) 
precipitating and predisposing factors, delusions might be constructed in essence to 
protect the individual from the fear of the unknown and to maintain the integrity of the 
individual’s core belief systems (Roberts, 1992, Maher, 1992) and sense of wellbeing 
(Jolley, Garety, Bebbington, Dunn, Freeman, Kuipers &…Hemsley, 2006). However, the 
newly constructed belief may not fit in with the most plausible explanation. Self-esteem 
might also have a role in the formation and maintenance of delusions (Jolley et al., 2006), 
where beliefs are formed in order to preserve an individual’s self-esteem. This has 
particular clinical implications because individuals with higher self-esteem and purpose 
might be prone to higher levels of delusional ideation, and find their delusions to be on 
the rewarding and positive side (Roberts, 1991).  
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Incompatible situations and explanations might be viewed as a defensive act if the 
plausible explanation is somehow threatening to their perceived integrity/wellbeing. 
Stated another way, individuals might try to irrationally explain anomalous experiences 
due to a fear or intolerance of the unknown combined with other indefinite predisposing 
and precipitating factors. The intolerance of uncertainty can invoke depression and 
anxiety (Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994; Maher, 1992), both of 
which tend to have relationships with delusions (Colbert, Peters, & Garety, 2010) and 
schizotypy (Debbané, Van der Linden, Gex-Fabry, & Eliez, 2009). Furthermore irrational 
beliefs may be reinforced through the comfort and relief from tension and anxiety that 
they provide regardless of the soundness of that explanation (Maher, 1992). However, 
once formed, these irrational beliefs create their own potential for distress and conflict. 
The formation and presence of delusions can be related to reported levels of stress 
(Maher, 1992), anxiety, and depression (Colbert, Peters, & Garety, 2010). Affect and 
feelings may also influence perceptual experiences, symptomology, and memory (Ditman 
& Kuperberg, 2005; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Daily life stressors in 
particular have been linked to negative lifestyle factors and symptoms of psychosis and 
perhaps even precipitating certain psychological symptoms (Barrantes-Vidal, Chun, 
Myin-Germeys, & Kwapil, 2013). 
Similarly, this process of delusional formation stated above can be applied to 
medical issues. Currently, there is a desire in multiple fields for research that seeks to 
focus on relationships between schizophrenia-spectrum and mental health diagnoses and 
physical illnesses as well as how they impact the individual (Slavich, 2015; Vancampfort, 
De Hert, Sweers, De Herdt, Detraux, & Probst, 2013). Previous associations with 
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schizophrenia include: asthma (Pedersen, Benros, Agerbo, Børglum, & Mortensen, 
2012); obesity and other persistent diagnoses (Shen, Sambamoorthi, & Rust, 2008); and 
cognitive impairments in immediate memory and attention in individuals that have been 
diagnosed with both schizophrenia and diabetes (Han, Huang, Chen, Xiu, Kosten, & 
Zhang, 2013). However, very little to no research exists on physical illnesses and 
schizotypy. If an individual has a medical experience, they might also seek to find an 
explanation or cause. If the resulting explanation is not rational, similar dysfunctional and 
perhaps delusional beliefs and ideation might arise in order to experience the relief 
associated with understanding the source of a medical ailment.  It is also possible for an 
individual to feel that a remission from a medical issue or even the initial diagnoses 
means that they were chosen or are being punished by something. This follows the 
thought pattern of self-serving attributional biases in which individuals determine and 
interpret the meaning of events around them in a way that best serves them. This includes 
placing the cause of positive events on themselves, and the cause of negative events on 
others (Bradley, 1978; Roese & Olson, 2007).  
Cognitive processes and obsessions. According to modern cognitive theory, all 
people form a wide range of mental representations (schema) that work to organize 
information about the world and help anticipate future events (Beck & Haigh, 2014). 
When an individual encounters a scenario, these automatic processes help to provide 
meaning to, or explain, the individual’s experiences. Cognitive biases and distortions are 
actually quite common and are believed to underlie clinical issues such as anxiety and 
depression (Beck & Haigh, 2014). For example, many individuals with depressive 
tendencies engage in catastrophizing, which is the inclination to focus on the most 
8 
 
negative potential outcome of a situation. Similarly, research suggests that there is some 
level of overlap between schizophrenia-spectrum and obsessive-compulsive symptoms 
whereby an idea becomes difficult to shake and may lead to seemingly irrational 
behavioral responses (Sobin, Blundell, Weiller, Gavigan, Haiman, & Karayiorgou, 2000). 
Thus, cognitive failures may be quite common and represent instances when cognitive 
processes such as thoughts and memory cease to operate in a functional, productive, and 
adaptive manner. Yet, for the schizophrenia-spectrum conditions, there appears to be 
additional cognitive errors involved in the formation and maintenance of delusional 
beliefs and hallucinatory experiences. Therefore, examining obsessive and compulsive 
symptoms and beliefs on a sub-clinical level might further provide insight on how this 
and similar phenomena contribute to the formation and maintenance of delusional beliefs 
and additional beliefs.  
One cognitive process, called source monitoring, that has received a good deal of 
attention involves the incorrect attribution of the source of material and information 
presented to an individual (Arguedas, Stevenson, & Langdon, 2012; Johnson et al., 1993; 
McKague, McAnally, Skovron, Bendall, & Jackson, 2012; Woodward & Menon, 2011; 
Woodward, Menon, & Whitman, 2007). Source monitoring is linked with memory 
(Hekkanen, & McEvoy, 2002; Johnson et al., 1993; Moritz & Woodward, 2006) and can 
be studied in situations where individuals are presented with material that can be 
interpreted as internally generated (e.g., imagine themselves turning a door knob) or as 
externally generated (e.g., viewing the experimenter’s pantomime of turning the door 
knob).  The individual would later be presented with the stimuli and asked to recall its 
source. Individuals with delusions and hallucinations tend to have higher amounts of 
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misattributions in such activities (Johnson et al., 1993), especially where they view 
internally created experiences as externally generated, a process commonly referred to as 
the externalization bias (Bentall, 1990; Woodward & Menon, 2011). Source monitoring 
errors may contribute to hallucinatory experiences (Arguedas et al., 2012; Larøi, 
Collignon, &  Van der Linden, 2005; Woodward & Menon, 2011; Woodward et al., 
2007) as hallucinations can be viewed as internal experiences attributed to external 
sources (Woodward & Menon, 2011). Individuals with schizophrenia, when indicating 
the confidence of their recall source response, tend to be more confident when they are 
making misattributions and exhibit a reduced amount of confidence when they indicate 
an accurate response (Moritz & Woodward, 2006). This is a particularly important point 
when considering the influence of misattributions, self-certainty, and confidence in 
inaccurate or false situations. For example, if an individual sees a stranger multiple times 
throughout their day while they are shopping, they may then have the thought (internally 
generated) “This person must be following me” which may or may not be true. If this 
situation is a coincidence, but the individual strongly believes that the stranger is up to no 
good, this can lay the foundation for further alarming thoughts and delusional beliefs 
(e.g., “I am in danger”, “It must be the government”). These misattribution errors may be 
a potential target for clinical interventions whereby individuals can begin to evaluate the 
veracity of their thoughts and perceptions using the principles of cognitive behavioral 
theory (Kingdon & Turkington, 2005). Understanding the source of information can also 
be central to the cognitive aspects of thinking, forming, and constructing belief systems, 
thoughts, interactions, and opinions (Johnson et al., 1993). Therefore if faulty notions or 
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attribution errors begin to form the basis of these cognitive aspects, delusional and 
dysfunctional beliefs may become apparent.  
One additional cognitive process termed metacognition has also received attention 
as a possible contributor to the schizophrenia-spectrum conditions. Metacognition 
involves thinking about our thoughts and cognitions and trying to regulate them (Schraw, 
1998). These metacognitive processes have been linked to anxiety (Debbané et al., 2012) 
and schizotypy (Debbané et al., 2012; Chan, Spencer, West, Viegas, & Bedwell, 2015). 
Specific types of metacognitive beliefs tend to be present in those prone to hallucinations 
and exhibiting the externalization bias in source monitoring (Larøi et al., 2005). 
Individuals with a diagnosis on the schizophrenia spectrum overall have higher 
metacognitive subscale scores related to the beliefs that thoughts are uncontrollable and 
dangerous, positive beliefs about worrying (i.e., “I need to worry or I will not be safe”), 
and beliefs regarding the need to control their thoughts (Perona‐Garcelán, García‐Montes, 
Ductor‐Recuerda, Vallina‐Fernández, Cuevas‐Yust, Pérez‐Álvarez, & ... Gómez‐Gómez, 
2012). Metacognitions have also been linked to the prediction of the presence of 
delusional ideation (Stainsby & Lovell, 2014) and higher levels of schizotypy (Chan et 
al., 2015). Bruno et al. (2012) corroborated other recent research and found that 
individuals with schizophrenia tend to have impairments with metacognitions. They also 
found that those with delusions had more impairments than others with schizophrenia, 
and higher conviction in their delusional ideation themselves. Though research is mixed, 
studies have speculated that metacognitive beliefs are more involved in the maintenance 
than and not so much the formation of delusional beliefs (Bruno et al., 2012; Goldstone, 
Farhall, Thomas, & Ong, 2013)  
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Social and societal experiences/beliefs. The surroundings, social experiences, 
and lifestyle of individuals might certainly be very influential to the formation and 
maintenance of beliefs. Studies involving delusional beliefs often compare the formation 
and maintenance of these beliefs to beliefs such as religion and politics in that all three 
have the potential to be formed and maintained in a similar manner. However, religion 
and politics are considered to be widely accepted by many societies and do not tend to be 
grouped in the realm of delusional beliefs (Roberts, 1991; Maher, 1992; Jaspers, 1968), 
though those in the field tend to see delusional beliefs and other beliefs such as religion 
on a continuum that also includes normative and accepted beliefs (Smith, Riley, & Peters, 
2009; Roberts, 1991). 
Research has also shown that individuals with mental health diagnoses, including 
diagnoses on the schizophrenia-spectrum, can sometimes feel more empowered and have 
more positive outlooks on their diagnoses and life if they feel a sense of influence or 
involvement in their community (Lawn, McMillan, Comley, Smith, & Brayley, 2014; 
Liberman, 2012). Therefore these individuals might be more proactive in seeking to 
understand and cope with their symptoms. This might also be due to supportive social 
interactions within their community (Jolley, Ferner, Bebbington, Garety, Dunn, Freeman, 
&…Kuipers, 2014).  
The importance of social support in the development and consolidation of 
delusional beliefs is not well understood.  The process of social isolation could 
conceivably contribute to consolidation of delusions since the individual may not be able 
to gauge the veracity of their personal thoughts with trusted others.  The absence of 
corrective feedback could foster the drift from consensual reality during formative 
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periods (Saha et al., 2012).  However, delusions can certainly develop and persist even in 
the presence of stable and supportive social networks that are providing corrective 
feedback (Onwumere et al., 2016). So, the quality of social relationships may be an 
idiopathic factor that is more relevant in the development of delusions for some 
individuals than others.  
In keeping with the notion that many factors can possibly contribute to delusional 
ideation, the present study sought to identify potential factors that could influence the 
formation and maintenance of beliefs, more specifically, delusional ideation and beliefs. 
Based on current literature, we have developed 3 a priori hypotheses. Hypothesis 1: 
levels of delusional ideation will be significantly related to scores on the cognitive-
perceptual (“positive symptoms”) dimension of our schizotypy measure, and 
hallucinatory experiences. These relationships would provide evidence for construct 
validity (theoretical basis) of our primary measures and would be consistent with robust 
findings from the empirical literature. Hypothesis 2: delusional ideation will be predicted 
by the presence of greater negative emotions and cognitive biases/errors (i.e., source 
monitoring errors, metacognitive beliefs, intolerance of uncertainty, attributional errors, 
obsessional beliefs) and unique experiences (physical health problems, social network). 
As the literature has shown that the path to the formation and maintenance of delusions is 
highly individualized, acknowledging potential phenomena present would provide 
foundational ground to further elaborate on specific pathways to delusional belief 
formation and maintenance. Certain factors might be present prior to delusion formation, 
or occur concurrently, or afterwards in a state of maintenance.  Hypothesis 3: sense of 
purpose, self-esteem, and positive affect would be predicted by delusional ideation, 
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especially expansive delusions. Research Question 1: finally, as an exploratory 
component (no directional predictions made) we will examine the extent to which the 
variables in this study are related to religiosity, spirituality, personal beliefs, and beliefs 
relating to community involvement and connection.   
To our knowledge, this is the first time the aforementioned influences have been 
studied together. The potential findings from this study could illuminate the processes 
underlying the formation and maintenance of delusional beliefs and ideation. Clinically, 
understanding the role of delusional beliefs and beliefs in diagnoses might ultimately aid 




















Data was collected from 200 (males=118, females=81, other gender spectrum=1) 
Rowan University undergraduate students (ages 18-36) enrolled in Essentials of 
Psychology courses. Within this course, students are required to participate in research as 
a way to earn points towards their grade. The students have the choice of participating in 
an ongoing university affiliated study or an alternative project involving reading journal 
articles and writing a short review. Inclusion criteria for participation in this study 
involved being 1) a Rowan University student in an Essentials of Psychology course, and 
2) 18 years old or older. A total of seven participants were excluded from data analysis as 
they provided responses to open ended items consisting of random strings of letters or 
similar response patterns (n=3) or if they did not complete all of the measures due to 
technical difficulties with the online platform (n=4). Of our participants, 66% identified 
as Caucasian, 15% identified as African American, 8% identified as African American, 
6% identified with multiple ethnicities, 3.5% identified as Asian, and 1.5% identified as 
ethnicities not listed.  
Measures 
Participants completed the following measures related to our variables of interest 
in this study.  
Delusional ideation. Delusional ideation was measured using an expanded 
version of the Peters et al., Delusions Inventory (PDI-40; Peters, Joseph, & Garety, 
1999). The original PDI-40 contains eight categories of delusions represented through 40 
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items, with 5 items per category. The eight categories include delusions of control; 
misinterpretations, misidentification, delusions of reference; delusions of persecution; 
expansive delusions; delusions concerning various types of influence and primary 
delusions; other delusions; simple delusions based on guilt, depersonalization, 
hypochondriasis; and thought reading, insertion, echo, and broadcast delusions. For each 
item, the participants responded either “yes” or “no” to a question representing a 
delusional belief. If “no” is selected, the participant goes on to the next item. Items 
include, “Do you ever feel as if things in magazines or on TV were written especially for 
you?” If “yes” is selected, additional sub-items were presented to the participant. The 
original PDI-40 has 3 sub-items that involve the distress, preoccupation, and conviction 
the participant feels they have in terms of the original item. All three sub-items are 
measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5. The distress dimension ranges 
from “Not at all distressing” to “Very distressing.” The preoccupation dimensions ranges 
from “Hardly ever think about it” to “Think about it all the time.” The conviction 
dimension ranges from “Don’t believe it’s true” to “Believe it is absolutely true.” 
 In order to gain a deeper understanding of what these items mean in terms of their 
influence on the individual, the authors have amended the PDI-40 by adding additional 
sub-items to the 3 original sub-items of the scale. Participants were asked to provide a 
response to the sub-items if they select “yes” to the main item. Since beliefs can be 
accepted in certain societies and be normative and in others be considered to be odd or 
delusional (i.e., certain religious practices, feelings, or political endeavors) we added an 
item to examine whether the beliefs or ideas endorsed are representative of a culture to 
which the participant belongs. The response choices are yes/no with an option to provide 
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the name of the culture. We also asked how much the initial item means and its 
importance to the participant on a 5-point Likert scale similar to the 3 sub-items 
explained above. We asked a yes/no question regarding whether the participant thinks 
that the endorsed belief is something that influences other parts of their life. They are also 
provided the option to elaborate on this item through an optional opened ended response 
if they would like. The next additional item asked participants if they think that the 
endorsed belief arose to explain something around them. This has a yes/no response and a 
similar option for elaboration. We also asked whether they think the endorsed belief 
happened more recently in their life or when they were younger. This sub-item also has 
an optional elaboration response. We then asked if they have shared this belief with 
others and how the other person reacted or how participants think others would react. 
Response options are yes/no, with an open-ended elaboration response. Finally, we 
provided an additional comments option, in case participants wanted to write or describe 
anything else about the item. Findings from the expanded portion of this measure are not 
included in this study. 
The original PDI-40 has good psychometric properties with internal consistency 
represented by a Cronbach alpha of 0.88. The original measure also demonstrates test-
retest reliability (r= 0.82, p< 0.001). Concurrent validity was seen when the measure was 
compared to similar measures and criterion validity was also established (Peters et al., 
1999).  
Schizotypy. Schizotypy was measured using the Schizotypal Personality 
Questionnaire-Brief Revised (SPQ-BR; Cohen, Matthews, Najolia, & Brown, 2010). 
Seven subscales are incorporated into 32 items on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 0 
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(“Strongly Disagree”) to 4 (“Strongly Agree”). The measure includes three commonly 
accepted subscales that mirror the symptom clusters of schizophrenia: positive (i.e., odd 
perceptual experiences and magical thinking), negative (i.e., social isolation, constrained 
affect), and disorganized (i.e., odd behaviors, disorganized speech and thought content). 
Items on the positive domain include “Do you believe in clairvoyance (psychic forces, 
fortune telling)?” Negative schizotypy is represented by items such as “I feel very 
uncomfortable in social situations involving unfamiliar people.” The disorganized 
subscale includes items such as “I sometimes jump quickly from one topic to another 
when speaking.” The SPQ-BR demonstrates convergent validity and an internal 
reliability of a Cronbach alpha of 0.95 (Cohen et al., 2010).  
Hallucinatory-like experiences. The Launay-Slade Hallucinations Scale-Revised 
(LSHS-R) was regenerated based on a description of items provided by Bentall & Slade 
(1985) and included alternate response guidelines. Following the alternate response 
guidelines, the version of the LSHS-R used in the present study includes 12 items whose 
responses are rated by selecting from the following Likert-style scale: Certainly applies 
(5), Possibly applies (4), Unsure (3), Possibly does not apply (2), and Certainly does not 
apply (1). Items include “In the past I have had the experience of hearing a person’s voice 
and then found that no one was there.” The LSHS-R has acceptable internal consistency 
with a Cronbach alpha of 0.90 (Fonseca-Pedrero, Lemos-Giráldez, Paino, Sierra-Baigrie, 
Villazón-García, García-Portilla González, & Muñiz, 2010).  
Mood. The Depression, Anxiety, Stress Scales (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 
1995) functioned as a measurement of mood related to depression, anxiety, and stress. 
The DASS contains 42 items with 3 subscales (depression, anxiety, stress) that each 
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contain 14 items. Responses are in the form of a 4 point Likert scale ranging from 0 (did 
not apply to me at all) to 3 (applied to me very much, or most of the time.). Items include 
“I found myself getting upset by quite trivial things.” Internal consistency of the DASS 
subscales are adequate with the following Cronbach’s alphas: 1) depression (0.97), 2) 
anxiety (0.92), and 3) stress (0.95). Concurrent validity was also demonstrated (Antony, 
Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998).  
Metacognitions. The Metacognitions Questionnaire-30 (MCQ-30; Wells & 
Cartwright-Hatton, 2004) is a 30 item questionnaire regarding metacognitive beliefs. 
Each item is scored on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“do not agree”) to 4 (“agree 
very much”). There are 5 subscales: cognitive confidence, positive beliefs about 
worrying, cognitive self-consciousness, uncontrollability and danger, and need to control 
thoughts. Items include “Worrying helps me to avoid problems in the future.”  The MCQ-
30 has good-excellent internal consistency with Cronbach’s alpha ranging from 0.72 to 
0.93 for the subscale scores and the total score. Construct and convergent validity were 
also demonstrated (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004).  
Demographics and health. In order to gain helpful background information 
involving the demographics of each participant, the Demographics and Health 
Questionnaire, compiled by the researchers involved in this study, allowed participants to 
provide demographic information such as age, gender, and ethnicity. Aspects of their 
health were also asked, but not examined, in the current study including items relating to 
smoking, family history of mental illnesses, diet, brief information on physical illnesses, 
and fitness.  
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Items about health attitudes were obtained from the Sample Questionnaire: 
Diabetes (Stanford Patient Education Research Center). Although these were written with 
a person who has diabetes in mind, the items we selected are general enough to allow us 
to gauge the health attitudes of the participants in order to see how variances in responses 
to these items potentially relate to the variables in this study.  We have also generated six 
items involving the number and satisfaction felt by participants regarding their specific 
social relationships.  
Sense of purpose. This construct was measured using a subscale from the 
Lifestyle and Habits Questionnaire-Brief Version (LHQ-B; Dinzeo, Thayasivam, & 
Sledjeski, 2014). This questionnaire is broken up into eight lifestyle categories consisting 
of health and exercise, psychological health, substance use, nutrition, environmental 
concern, social concern, accident prevention, and sense of purpose. Each of these 
categories have a total score that matches with a scoring sheet provided to the participants 
that rates their scores in each category into bottom, middle, and top ranges based on the 
participant’s gender. Sense of purpose was the only subscale from this measure used in 
the current study. Items on this subscale include “I find meaning in my life,” “I believe 
every life has a purpose,” and “I have a sense of connectedness to something larger than 
myself, whether it is organized religion, nature, or social causes.”   Responses are 
indicated via a 5 point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly 
Agree.” Preliminary psychometric data for the sense of purpose subscale was fair at 0.66 




Quality of life beliefs. The WHOQOL-SRPB (Saxena, 2006) measured quality of 
life factors viewed through the frame of spirituality, religiousness, and personal beliefs. It 
consists of 32 items where each participant can choose how they would like to answer 
each item. That is, they can decide whether they view their beliefs from a place of 
spirituality, religiousness, or personal beliefs. Saxena (2006) noted that they added four 
additional items that allow the participant to express their level of spirituality, 
religiousness, and personal beliefs. These four items are added to the beginning of the 
questionnaire bringing the total number of items to 36. Items include “To what extent do 
you have feelings of inspiration/excitement in your life?” Cronbach’s alpha for this 
measure was 0.91 (Saxena, 2006). The present study only utilized the four additional 
items assessing the extent of endorsement of spirituality, religiosity, and personal beliefs.  
5 conditions (source monitoring). We have adapted a source monitoring activity 
presented in a study by Larøi et al. (2005), which involves 5 different types of conditions. 
The conditions include a verbal phase in which the participant listens to an action phrase, 
a visual phase in which the experimenter carries out an action in the item, an imagined 
visual phase in which the participant imagines the experimenter carrying out an action in 
the item, a motor phase where the participant completes the action present in the item, 
and an imagined motor phases in which the participant imagine themselves carrying out 
the action present in the item. In total for the original activity, there were 60 items present 
in the study or memorization phase, which were divided into 15 blocks each containing 4 
items. After every 4 items, the condition changes and this is explained at each time to the 
participant. Each condition has 12 items. Two action and two imagined conditions cannot 
directly follow each other, so the order we have chosen is verbal, imagined motor, visual, 
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imagined visual, and motor. The order of the conditions stayed the same but we have 
randomized the items within each condition in order to create 3 different versions to 
lessen fatigue and aspects of order effect. The recall phase consisted of the participant 
going through items that presented the phrases in the study phase randomly mixed with 
an additional 60 phrases, bringing the total item number to 120. The participant selected 
whether they felt each phrase in each item was “New” or “Old.” If they believed it was 
old, then they indicated what condition they believed it was from. For all items, the 
participant provided a confidence level of their overall response. The measure that we 
adapted from Larøi et al. (2005) contained additional aspects that we felt were not 
required for the purposes of our study. Therefore, we did not use such aspects.    
Due to time constraints and other factors, we chose to shorten the 5 conditions 
activity. The basic frame described above still stands with amended numbers. There were 
still 5 different types of conditions, with an amended total of 40 items presented in the 
study or memorization phases, which were divided up into 10 blocks that each contained 
4 items. As stated above, after every 4 items the conditions changes. Each condition now 
has 8 instead of 12 items. The revised recall phase contained the 40 study and 40 
additional phrases, bringing the total to 80 items. Response options remained the same. 
Total scores of correctness for the old/new items and for the correct attribution of sources 
were created. Due to the highly individualized nature of each item, and the notion that 
each item response does not have to be related to any other item because of the nature of 




Cognition and explanatory styles. The Cognitive Bias Questionnaire for 
Psychosis (Peters, Mortiz, Schwannauer, Wiseman, Greenwood, Scott & …Garety, 2014) 
is a questionnaire designed to examine cognitive (thinking/thoughts/interpretations) 
biases that may exist and contribute to reasoning which, in turn can contribute to the 
formation and maintenance of delusional beliefs. There are 30 statements, each with 3 
response choices that represent different cognitive biases (intentionalising, 
catastrophizing, dichotomous thinking, jumping to conclusions, emotional reasoning). 
Fifteen items fall into the theme of anomalous perceptions, and 15 are related to 
threatening events. There are 6 responses per bias. The responses that go along with the 
statements are rated on a Likert scale from 1 to 3 (1= absence of bias; 2= presence of bias 
with some qualification; and 3= presence of bias). A total score for each theme and bias, 
and a total overall score were generated. Items include “Imagine that the phone rings. 
When you answer, the other party hangs up.” Responses this particular item are a) “I 
wonder if there’s something suspicious about this”, b) “somebody is definitely checking 
up on me”, and c) “someone’s probably got the wrong number.” This measure has 
excellent psychometrics with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.89 representing internal 
consistency and test-retest scores of 0.96 (Peters et al., 2014).   
Obsessive-compulsive thoughts and beliefs. The Obsessive-Compulsive 
Inventory-short form (OCI-R: Foa, Huppert, Leiberg, Langner, Kichic, Hajack, & 
Salkovskis, 2002) is an 18 item questionnaire that provides statements and asks the 
participant to indicate to what level were they distressed or bothered by the matter in the 
statement. Responses ranged from 0=not at all to 4= extremely, on a 5-point Likert scale. 
Items include “I check things more often than necessary.” The OCI-R has demonstrated 
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good internal consistency, test-retest reliability, and convergent and divergent validity 
(Foa et al., 2002).  
Self-esteem, wellbeing. The Flourishing Scale (Diener, Wirtz, Tov, Kim-Prieto, 
Choi, Oishi, & Biswas-Diener, 2010) is an 8 item measure that provides statements for 
the participants to rate on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) Likert scale. The 
statements involve how the individual feels about themselves, their self-esteem, and 
sense of purpose. Items include “I am engaged and interested in my daily activities” and 
“People respect me.” This measure has demonstrated very good internal consistency with 
a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.87 (Diener et al., 2010).  
Uncertainty. The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, 
Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994) is a 27 item measure with responses ranging from 1 (not 
characteristic of me at all) to 5 (entirely characteristic of me) on a 5-point Likert scale. 
Items include “Uncertainty stops me from having a strong opinion.” Internal consistency 
was excellent with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.94. Test-retest reliability was shown to have a 
coefficient of r=0.74 (Buhr & Dugas, 2002). 
Civic responsibility. We compiled an amended version of the Civic 
Responsibility Questionnaire (Furco, Muller, & Ammon, 1998) in order to attempt to 
gauge participant’s beliefs about being involved in their community and if their 
involvement has positive or negative influence on their life. The original Civic 
Responsibility Questionnaires comes in 3 levels that correspond to 3 different schooling 
levels (elementary, middle, and high school). We have combined the 3 levels to form one 
questionnaire of 34 items. Responses are gauged on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Items include “I feel like I am part of a 
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community.” This questionnaire appears to be used typically in primary and secondary 
educational settings. Because of this, no psychometric information could be found for this 
measure. Any findings relating to this measure will be considered exploratory.  
Affect. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS;Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988) is a 20 item measure that includes 10 positive emotion/feelings words 
and 10 negative emotion/feelings words. Participants are asked to rate how much the 
emotion/feelings word applies to them in the present moment based off of a 5-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). Items include 
“Interested” and “Upset.” The measure has demonstrated very good reliability and 
validity with a Cronbach’s alpha being 0.86 to 0.90 for positive words and 0.84 to 0.87 
for negative words (Watson et al., 1988). 
Memory and cognition. In order to assist in determining the value of the 
responses from the source monitoring (5 conditions) activity, we have chosen to include 
the Extended Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (ECFQ; Das-Smaal, deJong, & 
Koopmans, 1993), which assesses memory through a 35 item questionnaire with 
responses on a 5-point Likert scale from 0 (never) to 4 (very often). The measure, created 
by Das-Smaal et al., (1993), combines a number of existing measures including 
Broadbent et al.’s Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (1982), Hermann & Neisser’s (1978) 
Inventory of Everyday Memory Experiences, and Reason & Mycielska’s (1982) Error 
Proneness Questionnaire. This will be used to interpret the participant’s capacity for 
working and recent memory, and error proneness. Ideally, responses on this measure will 
let us know the participant’s self-reported baseline of their memory abilities. For 
example, if a participant’s responses to this questionnaire indicate that they do not have 
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any self-reported memory issues and if the same participant has a multitude of errors on 
the 5 conditions recall, we might be able to consider the recall results as more towards 
schizophrenia-spectrum symptomology, rather than attribute them to solely memory 
errors. However, this will be taken as a guiding point for interpretation and not an 
absolute final statement on the participant’s memory and performance on the source 
monitoring recall. All other variables will also be taken into account and will also serve 
as a guide to interpreting the source monitoring (5 conditions) results. Items include “Do 
you find you forget why you went from one part of the house to the other?” Cronbach’s 
alpha for this measure is 0.88. However, the Das-Smaal et al. suggest more studies should 
be done involving the psychometric properties.  
Procedures 
This study has been approved by Rowan University’s Institutional Review Board. 
Participants met with a trained lab member from Rowan University’s Schizophrenia 
Spectrum Lab to complete the study in a face-to-face session. Upon arriving at the 
location and at the time that was selected by both groups online via Rowan University’s 
SONA system, the lab member explained this study and the consent procedures to the 
participant.  The information on the informed consent form was read, and there were 
opportunities for the potential participant to ask any questions they might have regarding 
the study and informed consent form and obtain answers from the researcher. It was also 
made clear to the potential participant that they were able to ask questions regarding their 
rights and elements of the study at any point in time. The participant was also informed 
that they were free to discontinue their participation in this study at any time, but would 
only receive the research credit for the completion of this study in its entirety. After this, 
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if the participant chose to participate in the study, they signed and dated the informed 
consent form. The lab member present also signed and dated this same form and a 
reproduction of the informed consent was given to the participant for their records. 
After consent was obtained, the lab member guided the participant through the 
series of questionnaires and activities. A number of questionnaires were provided online 
to participants via the Qualtrics platform in an effort to conserve paper, but were 
completed in front of a lab member during the session. The remaining questionnaires, the 
activity, and consent documents were completed on paper. Three different versions, each 
containing a different order of the various assessments, were created in order to address 
possible confounding patterns of response fatigue and order effects.  
Statistical Analysis 
 All data was evaluated prior to analysis. Instances of potential random 
responding, or outlier responses, were also evaluated. Data distributions were examined 
for normality (skew/kurtosis <2 for parametric tests). The existence of potential 
confounds related to sample characteristics such as gender and ethnicity were evaluated 
prior to analyses using independent sample t-tests and oneway ANOVAs for variables 
that were normally distributed and the Mann-Whitney U test and Kruskal-Wallis test for 
non-normally distributed variables.  
 Pearson and Spearman correlations were used in order to examine the 
relationships between delusional ideation, positive schizotypy, and hallucinatory 
experiences (Hypothesis 1).  
Data reduction via a principle component analysis (PCA) was conducted in order 
to condense the large amount of variables of interests in Hypothesis 2. Prior to 
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conducting the PCA, all relevant variable scores were standardized using z-scores. 
Additionally, source monitoring scores were evaluated using the scores from the ECFQ 
in order to determine whether source monitoring attribution errors were due to general 
memory impairments. Pearson correlations were used to examine this potential 
relationship and yielded no significant correlations. This may suggest that errors on our 
source monitoring measure may not have been due to general memory impairments. Due 
to this, source monitoring variables were added into the PCA after being standardized. 
Source monitoring total scores, collapsing across the five experimental conditions, were 
entered into the PCA. Additionally, in regards to physical health information no 
participant endorsed the presence of a type one or type two diabetes diagnoses. Similarly, 
asthma was infrequently endorsed (n=32). Thus, diabetes and asthma status were not 
included in the PCA.   
A series of hierarchal linear regression models predicting overall and subtypes of 
delusional ideation (Hypothesis 2) and predicting sense of purpose, self-esteem, and 
positive affect (Hypothesis 3) were created. Gender and ethnicity were included in the 
first step of each model as a control. Components from the PCA (Hypothesis 2) or 
delusional ideation subscales (Hypothesis 3) were included in the second step of these 
models.  
Research Question 1 was examined using modified versions of the hierarchal 
linear regression models that were used to test Hypothesis 2. Gender and ethnicity 
remained in the first step of these models as control variables. Normative beliefs 
(religiosity, spirituality, personal beliefs, and community involvement beliefs) were 





All data was evaluated for normality and differences in gender and ethnicity were 
controlled for during analyses. The majority of data were normally distributed with some 
exceptions. Persecutory delusions, delusions of thought, anxiety, and health interference 
were skewed and demonstrated kurtosis. Other delusions, depression, health worries, and 
the total score from the DASS measure had high kurtosis. Means, standard deviations 
(SD), number of items, gender and ethnicity differences, and internal consistency 
represented by Cronbach’s alpha are presented in Table 1.  From the PCA components, 
health concerns and source monitoring were skewed and demonstrated kurtosis. The 
cognitive-emotional and friend component from the PCA had high kurtosis. Amongst the 
PCA groupings only health concerns had significant gender differences via the Kruskal-
Wallis Test with females reporting higher concern for their health (p<.001). No other 
gender or ethnicity differences were found amongst the PCA variables.   
As presented in Table 1, some measures included in the current study have lower 
than recommended levels of Cronbach’s alpha being below a 0.70 (Tavakol & Dennick, 
2011). The PDI-40, which was our measure of delusional ideation, has an adequate total 
item alpha of 0.76. However, each individual sub-type of delusional ideation has an alpha 
lower than 0.6. This may be due to 1) the small number of items in each subscale (5 
items), 2) infrequency endorsement rates of delusional ideation in a college sample either 
due to social desirability or prior to onset of delusional ideation, 4) the dichotomous 
nature of the items, and 5) the notion that not all aspects of a given subtype of delusional 
ideation needs to be related and endorsed together.  Interestingly the authors of the PDI-
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40 have stated that the goal of their development of this measure was not for high internal 
consistency values to be present amongst potential subscales as this may only act to limit 
the conceptualization and nuanced nature of delusional ideation (Peters et al., 1999; 
Peters, Joseph, Day, & Garety, 2004). Alphas for the CBQ-P subscales were also below 
the recommended levels at lower than 0.46. The alpha for the total score of the CBQ-P is 
0.74. For the conceptual reasons mentioned above, we decided to include findings from 
these subscales in our analyses with an advisement of extra caution in any relating 
interpretations. For both of these measures the alpha at the total score levels were 
adequate. This further contributed to our decision to include the subscales in analyses 





Means, SD, items, internal consistency, and gender (independent samples t-test)/ 
ethnicity (oneway ANOVA) differences amongst measures  
Note. *n=196, **Mann Whitney U-test statistic, M=Male, F=female, C=Caucasian, H=Hispanic, AA=African American, A=Asian, 
O=other ethnicity not listed Note: M=Male, F=female, C=Caucasian, H=Hispanic, AA=African American, A=Asian, O=other 
ethnicity not listed, Mu=multiple ethnicities endorsed. 
 
 
  Items Mean SD α Gender/Ethnicity Differences 
Delusional Ideation 40 4.85 3.70 0.76 AA>C, p=.032 
Delusions of Control 5 0.55 0.69 0.03 F>M, p=.045 
Delusions of Reference 5 1.41 0.92 0.19 C<AA & A<AA, Mu p=.041 
Persecutory Delusions 5 0.23 0.57 0.45 
 Expansive Delusions 5 1.03 1.17 0.56 C<H, AA, O, p=.014 
Primary Delusions 5 0.70 0.77 0.11 C<AA,O; O>H, AA, A, Mu, p=.003 
Other Delusions 5 0.44 0.77 0.44 F>M,  p=.004** 
Simple Delusions 5 0.31 0.53 0.01 
 Delusions of Thought 5 0.19 0.44 0.09 
 Schizotypy 32 1.57 0.63 0.93 
 Positive 14 1.22 0.66 0.87 
 Interpersonal 10 1.75 0.78 0.86 
 Disorganized 8 1.96 0.87 0.89 
 Hallucinatory Experiences 12 2.30 0.70 0.84 
 DASS 42 0.50 0.57 0.96 F>M, p=.025** 
Depression 14 0.43 0.54 0.94  
Anxiety 14 0.41 0.44 0.88  
Stress 14 0.66 0.58 0.92 F>M, p<.001 
Metacognitions 30 2.08 0.43 0.88 
 Cog. Confidence 6 1.78 0.56 0.79 F>M, p=.013 
Pos. beliefs about worry 6 1.75 0.62 0.85 
 Cog. Self-conscious 6 2.74 0.62 0.81 
 Uncontrol & Danger 6 2.05 0.83 0.89 F>M, p=.001 
Need to control 6 2.06 0.58 0.66 
 Demographics and Health Questionnaire 
    Health Worries 4 2.98 3.73 0.89
Health Interference 4 1.02 1.90 0.79  
Number of friends* 1 11.63 26.43 
  Satisfaction with friends 1 78.65 22.62 
  Number of close family 1 6.93 5.77 
  Satisfaction with family 1 81.46 23.09 
  Partner Status 1 0.40 0.49 
  Satisfaction with partner 1 67.82 28.96 
  Lifestyle and Habits 
     Sense of Purpose 3 4.03 0.91 0.75
 Normative Beliefs 
     Religiosity 1 2.63 1.14
 
C<H,AA; AA>Mu, p=.001 
Spirituality 1 2.75 1.16 
 
C<H,AA; AA>Mu, p=.002 
Personal Beliefs 1 3.65 1.00 
  Civic Responsibility 35 4.03 0.79 0.96
 Source Monitoring 
     Old/New 80 1.59 0.33
  Source 80  1.27 0.37    
Cognitive Biases 30 1.45 0.20 0.74  
Catastrophizing 6 1.48 0.28 0.38  
Dichotomous Thinking 6 1.41 0.32 0.41 AA>C; O>C, A,  p=.014 
Jumping to conclusions 6 1.62 0.32 0.46 F>M, p=.005 
Emotional reasoning 6 1.35 0.28 0.36 C<H, AA, p<.001  
Intentionalising 6 1.38 0.24 0.36  
Obsessive-Compulsive Symptoms 18 0.92 0.72 0.92 AA>C, H, A, p=.017 
Intolerance of Uncertainty 27 1.99 0.71 0.95 F>M, p<.001 
Self-esteem 8 5.80 0.80 0.88  
Affect 20     
Positive Affect 10 2.69  0.77 0.91 M>F, p=.041 
Negative Affect 10 1.74 0.74 0.91 F>M, p=.009 
Extended Cognitive Failures 35    1.64 0.52 0.93   
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For our first hypothesis, overall delusional ideation was positively correlated to 
hallucinatory experiences (r=.36, p<.001), positive (r=.48, p<.001), interpersonal (r=.14, 
p=.043), and disorganized (r=.42, p<.001) schizotypy.  Hallucinatory experiences were 
positively correlated with positive (r=.62, p<.001), interpersonal (r=.34, p<.001), and 
disorganized (r=.46, p<.001) schizotypy.  Table 2 includes correlations amongst 




Excerpted Pearson and Spearman (in italics) correlations amongst delusional ideation 















Del. of Control .39*** .19** .32*** .34*** .32*** .57*** 
Del. of Reference .39*** .21** .39*** .39*** .37*** .69*** 
Persecutory del. .31*** .06 .30*** .28*** .16* .49*** 
Expansive del. .24*** -.07 .21** .15* .17* .72*** 
Primary del. .23*** -.03 .11 .13 .22*** .63*** 
Other del. .37*** .07 .24*** .28*** .18* .57*** 
Simple del. .24*** .23*** .28*** .30*** .19** .50*** 
Del. of Thought .29*** .15* .35*** .31*** .24*** .50*** 
Note. ***p<.001 **p<.010 *p=<.05, del.=delusions. 
 
We conducted a PCA in order for data reduction purposes for Hypothesis 2 as this 
method is typically conducive for data reduction purposes as it allows for multiple 
variables of interest to be groups into meaningful groupings (Joliffe & Morgan, 1992). 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin values indicated that the PCA 
was an appropriate method of examining these variables. Varimax rotation was applied in 
order to derive well-defined components (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Eight components 
emerged from the PCA with an Eigen value higher than 1. The total variance explained 
by these components are presented in Table 3 and the varimax rotations are presented in 
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Table 4. The first component contained many aspects relating to cognitions, emotions, 
and general mental health symptomology (cognitive-emotional). The second component 
related to health worries and interference in activities (health concerns), while the third 
component contained our source monitoring elements. The fourth component involved 
an individual’s partner status and satisfaction with this status. The fifth component 
involved confidence in cognitions, and cognitive biases relating to intentions and 
emotions (self-based reasoning). The sixth component included cognitive biases such as 
dichotomous thinking, jumping to conclusions, and catastrophizing. The seventh 
component involved the number of friends and the related satisfaction, while the eighth 
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Loadings 
 



















1 7.12 27.39 27.39 
 
7.12 27.39 27.39 
 
5.54 21.32 21.32 
2 1.99 7.64 35.02 
 
1.99 7.64 35.02 
 
2.12 8.15 29.47 
3 1.89 7.28 42.31 
 
1.89 7.28 42.31 
 
1.93 7.43 36.90 
4 1.65 6.33 48.64 
 
1.65 6.33 48.64 
 
1.87 7.17 44.07 
5 1.46 5.62 54.26 
 
1.46 5.62 54.26 
 
1.57 6.02 50.10 
6 1.28 4.93 59.19 
 
1.28 4.93 59.19 
 
1.55 5.94 56.04 
7 1.05 4.02 63.21 
 
1.05 4.02 63.21 
 
1.51 5.79 61.83 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A total of nine hierarchal linear regression models predicting overall and the eight 
sub-types of delusional ideation were examined for Hypothesis 2. Table 5 presents 
coefficient data for the nine regressions. The model predicting overall delusional ideation 
was significant. Both gender and ethnicity R2= .03, F(2, 197) = 3.29, p=.039 and the 
second step containing the eight components from the PCA R2= .10, F(8, 189) = 2.60, 
p=.010 significantly contributed to this prediction.     
Delusions of control, delusions of reference, and simple delusions were 
significantly predicted by the eight components (R2= .120, F(8, 189) = 3.296, p=.002; 
R2= .111, F(8, 189) = 3.013, p=.003; & R2= .101, F(8, 189) =  2.670, p=.008, 
respectively). The eight components were approaching significance in the prediction of 
persecutory delusional ideation R2= .071, F(8, 189) = 1.821, p=.075. The prediction of 
expansive delusions and primary delusions were not predicted by the eight components. 
Other delusions were predicted by gender and ethnicity only R2= .076, F(2, 197) =  











































































































For our third hypothesis, three hierarchal linear regression models predicting 
positive affect, self-esteem, and sense of purpose by delusional ideation were examined 
while controlling for gender and ethnicity differences. Table 6 presents the specific 
factors that significantly and independently contributed to the predictions of positive 
affect, self-esteem, and sense of purpose. The model predicting positive affect was 
approaching significance. The delusional ideation subscale step was approaching 
significance R2= .075, F(8, 189) = 1.981, p=.051. Despite the gender and ethnicity step 
not being significant, gender contributed to the prediction of positive affect. Self-esteem 
was significantly predicted by the delusional ideation subscales step R2= .227, F(8, 189) 
= 6.945, p<.001. Sense of purpose was significantly predicted by the delusional ideation 





Coefficient data for Hypothesis 3 hierarchal linear regression models 
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Del. Thought  0.075 0.95  0.007 0.088  -0.001 -0.012 






For Research Question 1, normative beliefs were added into the regressions 
models presented for Hypothesis 2. Table 7 presents coefficient data for the nine 
regression models. The model predicting overall delusional ideation was significant 
including the first step with gender and ethnicity R2= .032, F(2, 197) = 3.288, p=.039; 
the second step including normative beliefs R2= .108, F(4, 193) = 6.083, p<.001, and the 
third step including the eight components  from the PCA R2= .082, F(8, 185) = 2.439, 
p=.016. 
Delusions of control were predicted by normative beliefs (R2= .062, F(4, 193) = 
3.266, p=.013) and the eight components from the PCA R2= .104, F(8, 185) = 2.959, 
p=.004. Delusions of reference were significantly predicted by the third step including the 
eight components R2= .100, F(8, 185) = 2.680, p=.008. The model predicting 
persecutory delusions was not significant. Only the second step containing normative 
beliefs significantly predicted both expansive delusions R2= .133, F(4, 193) = 7.556, 
p<.001 and primary delusions R2= .198, F(4, 193) = 12.167, p<.001. Other delusions 
were significantly predicted by gender and ethnicity R2= .076, F(2, 197) =  8.148, 
p<.001 and normative beliefs R2= .045, F(4, 193) = 2.449, p=.048.  
Normative beliefs were approaching a statistically significant prediction of simple 
delusions R2= .045, F(4, 193) = 2.295, p=.061. Only the eight components significantly 
contributed to this prediction R2= .077, F(8, 185) = 2.044, p=.044. Delusions of thought 
were predicted by only the eight components of the PCA in the third step of the model 






























































































































The present study examined the potential contribution from a number of likely 
candidate processes in the formation and maintenance of delusional ideation and beliefs. 
Mixed support for the three over-arching study hypotheses was found. Possible evidence 
for the existence of idiopathic pathways to belief formation and maintenance will be 
discussed below.  Due to the complex and large number of variables of interest in this 
study, the discussion of findings is organized according to the order of hypotheses. 
Interpretation regarding the PCA can be found primarily with Hypothesis 2 and Research 
Question 1.  
Hypothesis 1 
Our first hypothesis involved examining the sub-clinical schizophrenia spectrum 
symptomology scores (i.e., delusional ideation, the cognitive-perceptual domain or 
“positive symptoms” of schizotypy, and hallucinatory experiences) and their relationships 
with each other. Scores from the schizotypy subscales, hallucinatory experiences, and 
delusional ideation were positively associated with each other, providing support for the 
construct validity of these measurements that are each intended to represent different 
facets of sub-clinical schizophrenia-spectrum phenomena. While scores on these 
measures cannot forecast the actual transition to a clinical schizophrenia-spectrum 
diagnosis, they are viewed as vulnerability/risk indicators (Verdoux & van Os., 2002). 
Examining sub-clinical symptomology in non-clinical samples (such as college students) 
has the benefit of allowing researchers to study spectrum-phenomenon without the 




research helps to establish timelines of symptom development. This may be especially 
true for the study of delusional beliefs since college is often seen as a transition towards 
adulthood where an individual may be examining and developing various beliefs (Arnett, 
1997; Arnett, 2000).  
 Our findings related to these symptom measures suggest that the PDI-40, SPQ-
BR, and LSHS-R might be beneficial in settings where there is a need to measure 
psychosis-risk over time (e.g., college campuses).  For example, the use of these 
measures as a screening tool, or to create a baseline for symptom severity, may help tailor 
services and preventative strategies. In addition, the scores on the other symptom 
measures included in the current study demonstrated good internal reliability and 
directional associations that are conceptually consistent with the constructs that they are 
intended to measure (e.g., DASS anxiety, Negative Affect, and OCS scores are all highly 
correlated). 
Hypothesis 2 
Our a priori predictions regarding the specific factors predicting delusional 
development were partially confirmed, although with notable exceptions. Specifically, 
Hypothesis 2 examined delusional ideation being predicted by the presence of greater 
negative emotions and cognitive biases/errors (i.e., source monitoring errors, 
metacognitive beliefs, intolerance of uncertainty, attributional errors, obsessional beliefs) 
and unique experiences (physical health problems, social network).  The first principle 
component, cognitive-emotional, significantly predicted overall delusional ideation as 
well as delusions of control (i.e., that others control the individual, that the individual is 




directed towards the individual), and other delusions (i.e., those involving somatic 
aspects, influence and perceptions of others). Therefore, as we anticipated, scores on 
measure of negative emotion (e.g., DASS, PANAS-negative affect) and certain cognitive 
tendencies (i.e., obsessive symptoms, intolerance of uncertainty, several meta-cognitive 
processes) predicted the severity of certain delusional domains.  
These findings suggest that the variables with the cognitive-emotional component 
are etiologically significant contributors to delusional beliefs.  For example, it may be 
possible that risk for delusional ideation (especially involving external control/influence) 
increases in the presence of heightened negative mood, intolerance of uncertainty, and 
specific metacognitive tendencies. However, not all individuals who experience these 
cognitive-emotional symptoms would be expected to develop delusional beliefs. Thus, 
there is likely an underlying “vulnerability” element such as schizotaxia, which is the 
putative biological risk variable believed to underlie schizophrenia, that interacts with 
these cognitive-emotional elements and are necessary for the manifestation of delusions 
(Meehl, 1990; Lenzenweger, 2006). This etiological view is largely consistent with 
Roberts who theorized that individuals settle on the delusional explanations, even if they 
are distressing, in an effort to explain anomalous or odd experiences (1991; 1992). Those 
who are more inclined towards having an intolerance of uncertainty may be more readily 
open to such explanations in order to relieve any tension or anxiety relating to the 
unknown (Maher, 1992). This may result in an individual accepting an explanation 
towards a perceived external control source, which may lay the foundation for delusional 




Our specific findings regarding “health-concerns” and paranoid ideation (i.e., 
persecutory delusions) can also be interpreted within a possible etiological framework. 
For example, at-risk individuals who are experiencing ambiguous internal (health-related) 
symptoms may be compelled to develop an explanation of their symptoms, even if it is 
not wholly consistent with consensual reality. This would be in line with research relating 
to the explanatory and meaning making aspects of the formation of delusional ideation 
(Maher 1992; Roberts, 1991, 1992). For example, this could represent a self-serving 
attributional bias by attributing negative internal states to circumstances outside of 
themselves (Bradley, 1978; Roese & Olson, 2007). Thus, certain individuals may be 
more prone to attributing their health to outside sources as a way of reducing uncertainty. 
Stated another way, the persecutory beliefs held by these individuals may act as a 
protective factor against even more anxiety-provoking issues related to health and 
mortality that they feel helpless/unable to address. Interestingly, our findings suggest that 
other delusions involving delusions relating to the influence of others and somatic 
concerns may also follow a similar pattern as delusions relating to external experience. 
 Delusions of reference may also represent features of externalization as an 
individual may feel better to place beliefs on outside factors that are out of one’s control, 
rather than to add to potential anxiety provoking internal thoughts and processes. 
Additionally, this may also reflect the notion of aberrant salience. Delusions of reference 
may be viewed as self-referential as the individual may find stimuli to be particularly 
salient to themselves, while others may view the same stimuli as neutral (Howes & 
Kapur, 2009; Cicero, Docherty, Becker, Martin, & Kerns, 2015). Thus, an individual who 




particularly salient and perhaps even anomalous experiences around them in order to 
make sense of them.  
Surprisingly, expansive and primary delusional ideation were not predicted by 
any of the eight PCA components (cognitive emotional, health concerns, source 
monitoring, partner, self-biased reasoning, cognitive biases, family, friends). This 
suggests that subtypes of delusional beliefs involving grandiose themes may not be 
related to the constructs/assessments included in the PCA, at least in our current sample. 
It is possible that these beliefs may be influenced by different cognitive processes or 
aspects of symptomology or that the use of aggregate PCA variables may have obscured 
the possible contributions of specific processes related to expansive and primary 
delusions. Yet the lack of empirical relationships may actually add credence to the notion 
of idiopathic and individualized factors contributing to the development and maintenance 
of delusional ideation. For example, there is a high probability that psychological factors 
influence the development of grandiose beliefs.  The fact that we did not identify the 
influential elements for these two clinically relevant delusion subtypes strongly suggests 
that we did not have the correct assessments, or methods, to reveal the unique 
characteristics associated with those specific delusional beliefs across individuals.  
Hypothesis 3 
Our third a priori hypothesis predicted that sense of purpose, self-esteem, and 
positive affect would be predicted by delusional ideation, especially expansive delusions. 
As anticipated, expansive delusions predicted sense of purpose and improved self-esteem 
(with positive affect approaching significance). This is consistent with a portion of the 




al., 2006; Martens, 2012; Sundag, Lincoln, Hartman, & Mortiz, 2015). In fact, this 
particular type of delusion may serve as a protective factor against low self-esteem and 
negative life events (Kingdon & Turkington, 2005). The content of specific types of 
delusional ideation may directly influence self-esteem or possibly present an internal self-
reflection of the individual (i.e., delusional content representing a kernel of truth; 
Kingdon & Turkington, 2005). In particular, expansive or grandiose content may act to 
boost self-esteem or perhaps reflect the individual’s already existing high sense of self. It 
is also important to consider the notion that expansive and primary delusional ideation 
may be viewed as beliefs relating to internal processes, not due to the influence of 
external sources. Although, we did not find evidence for specific internal processes using 
our own PCA groupings. 
We also found strong evidence that delusions of reference, persecutory delusions, 
and simple delusions were related to lower levels of sense of purpose and self-esteem. 
This may suggest that the content of the actual delusional belief is related to how an 
individual views themselves, with negative content being linked to negative self-
cognitions (Collett, Pugh, Waite, & Freeman, 2016).  
The finding that influences on self-esteem and sense of purpose depend on the 
content of delusional ideation may indicate a potentially important factor in the formation 
and maintenance of delusional beliefs. An individual’s view of themselves may be 
reflected within the content of their delusional belief and delusional ideation may inform 
an individual’s sense of self. The content of both internally (expansive, primary 
delusions) and externally (delusions of reference, persecutory delusions, simple 




of powerlessness and a perceived lack of autonomy (Martens, 2012). Thus, individuals 
scoring high on these PDI scales may have generated beliefs (unverifiable by others) 
relating to their own existing self-view involving special powers and abilities. These 
inherent perceptions and interpretations of surroundings and experiences may further 
guide the development and maintenance of delusional ideation as the resulting beliefs 
serve a purpose for the individual.  
Research Question 1: Exploratory 
As our Research Question 1 is exploratory in nature, we did not make any 
directional predictions relating to relationships amongst our variables of interest and 
normative beliefs (religiosity, spirituality, personal beliefs, and community involvement 
beliefs). We found mixed results in regards to normative beliefs and delusional ideation. 
Spirituality contributed to the prediction of both overall delusional ideation and delusions 
of reference, while the cognitive-emotional component was no longer significant. This 
may be because elements of spirituality may be a more salient predictor of these types of 
delusions then the cognitive-emotional component. Delusions of control were predicted 
by both spirituality and the cognitive-emotional component. This is an intriguing finding 
that includes the internal characteristics of the individual (i.e., scores on the cognitive-
emotional variables) as well as their openness to the influence of factors “greater than” 
the self.  The common theme may be a fear of loss of control or autonomy. The 
individual may find these delusional beliefs regarding loss of control as both beneficial 
and relieving as responsibility may be designated to factors outside of the self, but also 
anxiety provoking as the individual may feel that their experiences do not line up with 




Interestingly, persecutory delusions were not predicted by normative beliefs and 
were still only significantly predicted by health concerns as described with Hypothesis 2.  
Expansive and primary delusions were both predicted by spirituality, and were not 
predicted by any of the eight PCA components similar to Hypothesis 2.  This is in line 
with the nature of both of these delusional beliefs as they typically involve positive 
aspects directed towards special powers or abilities and having a purpose from a power 
greater than themselves. It may be possible that in endorsing spirituality, individuals may 
inherently possess a belief that they are an important participant in a transcendent 
spiritual process, which is reflected with a heightened view of themselves. This may 
allow for any grandiose-related beliefs to be more readily acceptable.  
 Other and simple delusions (i.e., beliefs based on guilt, depersonalization, 
hypochondriasis) were positively predicted by spirituality, but negatively predicted by 
religiosity. Surprisingly, this may suggest a distinct difference between the nature of 
spiritual and religious beliefs amongst college students where those who endorse higher 
levels of religiosity do not have many beliefs relating to guilt, sins, and somatic concerns. 
One way to view these finding is that those with religious beliefs may be more inclined to 
view their experiences (health concerns, stressors) as divine providence, and take comfort 
in common religious practices such as confession or repentance. Thus, these cultural 
elements might, in some ways, reduce concerns that might underlie certain types of 
delusional ideation for some individuals. Conversely, those who do not hold religious 
beliefs may view their experiences in a different framework (e.g., internal locus of 
control; Rotter, 1966), and as a result may experience greater guilt, depersonalization, 




subscribe to the cultural elements described above and may not attribute their experiences 
to divine providence.  
Delusions relating to thought reading and broadcasting were positively predicted 
by spirituality and negatively predicted by the number and satisfaction of friends. 
Interestingly, this suggests that those who endorse spiritual beliefs may be more inclined 
to endorse that their own thoughts are being shared without their permission to those 
around them. These individuals may not be open to social corrective feedback relating to 
their thoughts. Alternately, this may suggest that these individuals do not have a trusted 
and satisfying group of friends that they feel comfortable in sharing their thoughts with. 
Therefore, they may not have the opportunity to receive any social feedback relating to 
their thoughts and beliefs. In contrast, those with more friends and satisfaction with these 
relationships may be more responsive to social corrective feedback dissuading notions 
that their thoughts are being broadcasted without their permission.  
Both personal beliefs and civic responsibility did not contribute to the prediction 
of delusional ideation. This may be because both of these may be viewed as abstract 
concepts for individuals within our sample. Additionally, as previously mentioned 
individuals may be still in the process of developing beliefs relating to personal aspects 
and civic engagement (Arnett, 1997; Arnett, 2000) whereas religious or spiritual beliefs 
may be somewhat more so imparted to them at a younger age. Only three of the eight 
PCA components formed significant relationships with the prediction of delusional 






Overall Impressions of Findings and Larger Implications 
The results from this study provided evidence for important processes that might 
influence delusional ideation.  However, upon reflection, there are still many unanswered 
questions that our findings do not fully clarify.  For example, we still cannot say why 
some people develop delusional beliefs (let alone specific delusional beliefs) while others 
do not.  One barrier to discovering the idiopathic pathways to delusion development may 
involve the statistics we (as a field) employ. While gathering and reporting aggregate and 
average data is viewed as key within the research world, understanding the nuances of 
symptomology through more qualitative methodology may yield richer information in a 
clinical sense, especially with complex symptomology such as delusional beliefs. We did 
collect some limited qualitative data when administering the PDI-40 online, but the 
systematic examination of this data is outside the timeframe/scope of the current project. 
We do have a wealth of quantitative data that, if examined in a non-traditional way, may 
be useful in illustrating the variance of beliefs and symptomology across individuals (vs. 
averages).  For example, when we examined the scores from our symptom and belief 
measures in the three highest scoring PDI-40 scorers, we saw wide degree of variability.    
These individual differences may have been fundamental in understanding the specific 
delusional ideation endorsed. This could highlight the importance of qualitative 
methodology in researching beliefs as quantitative results only provide a certain depth of 
information and understanding of this highly intricate phenomenon. The importance of 
using mixed methods research may assist in providing both the strength of quantitative 




information regarding concepts of idiopathic factors, multifinality, and equifinality 
(Cicchetti & Rogosch, 1996). 
Additional Clinical Implications 
The consideration of the content, function, and meaning of beliefs may help guide 
potential interventions. Shaping potentially maladaptive or mildly distorted beliefs before 
they become systematized, and subsequently reinforced/maintained, may be key to 
successful preventive interventions. By addressing potential underlying aspects such as 
the intolerance of uncertainty, and the desire to impose an explanation on uncomfortable 
experiences, an individual could be taught how to assess the accuracy and logic of their 
own thoughts and beliefs. This might be especially important in those with risk-indicators 
or a family history of serious mental health disorders. It is also important to consider the 
interaction between delusional ideation, and an individual’s sense of purpose, self-
esteem, and positive affect. Without fully understanding this relationship we may be 
treating beliefs that act to maintain an individual’s self-view without providing any 
potential buffers.  This might have unintended negative consequences.  For example, 
someone with grandiose beliefs about unique abilities or characteristics that they possess 
may experience an increase in distress and other factors such as depression if this 
grandiose belief was not present due to implications of treatment. 
Limitations 
There were a number of limitations in the present study. Participants in this study 
were a part of a convenience sample, with a majority being male and Caucasian. This 
may impact the generalizability of any findings. Additionally, all data collected was 




study may have caused some participants to experience fatigue. Similarly, there were a 
large number of variables present in this study, which may be related to statistical 
artifacts (e.g., multicollinearity; alpha inflation with multiple comparisons).  On the other 
hand, we recognize that the development of beliefs is extremely nuanced and we may not 
have had enough of the “right” measures to adequately capture these processes. Although 
a majority of the measures used in this study have reliable psychometric properties, there 
were some measures such as the PDI-40 and the CBQ-P in which internal consistency by 
Cronbach’s alpha were lower than recommended values. However, the authors of the 
PDI-40 have stated that this may not be a strong limitation as it allows for the nuances of 
delusional ideation within sub-types to exist. Additionally, we may be assessing points in 
a sub-clinical population where beliefs may be developing, but we are unable to develop 
exact timelines of this. In regards to the PCA, despite gaining meaningful groupings of 
our variables, we may have also lost information regarding the contributions of the 
variables that comprised each of the eight resulting components. Finally, due to the 
nature of our study variables, elements of social desirability in disclosing information 
regarding mental health and other factors may have been present. Despite these 
limitations, findings from this study contribute to the current literature.   
Future Research 
Future research should seek to expand and clarify on the idiosyncratic factors that 
may contribute to the formation and maintenance of delusional ideation. Further 
understanding of the possible factors that influence this phenomenon may strongly 
influence future treatment interactions and interventions. In order for this to occur, 




delusional ideation in order to highlight their multifaceted influence. Future research 
should also look to establishing longitudinal studies of delusion formation and 
maintenance in a variety of samples such as sub-clinical, clinical high risk, first episode, 
and chronic populations. As stated above, mixed methods research of beliefs and 
delusional ideation is extremely important to increase our understanding on both 
universal and idiopathic factors that may contribute to the formation and maintenance of 
delusional beliefs.  
Conclusions  
The present study provides some further support for the potential idiopathic and 
specific pathways by which delusional ideation is formed and maintained. Elements of 
cognitive processes, mood, symptomology, social interactions and satisfaction, and at 
times certain normative beliefs appeared to be present and predictive of certain types of 
delusional ideation. Additionally, potential positive and maladaptive influences of 
delusional ideation were also examined and suggested that the content of delusional 
beliefs may also be reflective of an individual’s own self view. Delusional ideation may 
therefore form in part due to an intolerance of uncertainty, beliefs reflecting one’s self-
view, and relationships between concurrent health and social supports in order to provide 
a sense of relief from any distress or tension. 
Additionally, some of the elements examined, including self-view and social 
supports, may also form corrective reality-based feedback that is protective against the 
formation of delusional beliefs. Examining sub-clinical symptomology in the pathways to 
the formation and maintenance of beliefs, including delusional ideation, may further 




individuals with delusional ideation.  This study helps to move the field forward in 
understanding these pathways and how the formation and maintenance of delusional 

























American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental  
 disorders (5th ed.).  Washington, DC: Author.  
Antony, M. M., Bieling, P. J., Cox, B. J., Enns, M. W., & Swinson, R. P. (1998).  
 Psychometric properties of the 42-item and 21-item versions of the Depression 
 Anxiety Stress Scales in clinical groups and a community sample. Psychological 
Assessment, 10(2), 176-181. doi:10.1037/1040-3590.10.2.176 
Arguedas, D., Stevenson, R. J., & Langdon, R. (2012). Source monitoring and olfactory 
hallucinations in schizophrenia. Journal Of Abnormal Psychology, 121(4), 936-
43. doi:10.1037/a0027174 
 
Arnett, J. J. (1997). Young people's conceptions of the transition to adulthood. Youth &  
 Society, 29(1), 3-23. doi:10.1177/0044118X97029001001.  
 
Arnett, J. J. (2000). Emerging adulthood: A theory of development from the late teens 
 through the twenties. American Psychologist, 55(5), 469-480. doi:10.1037/0003- 
066X.55.5.469 
 
Barrantes-Vidal, N., Chun, C. A., Myin-Germeys, I., & Kwapil, T. R. (2013).  
Psychometric schizotypy predicts psychotic-like, paranoid, and negative 
symptoms in daily life. Journal Of Abnormal Psychology, 122(4), 1077-1087. 
doi:10.1037/a0034793 
 
Beck, A. T., & Haigh, E. P. (2014). Advances in cognitive theory and therapy: The 
generic cognitive model. Annual Review Of Clinical Psychology, 101-24.  
doi:10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-032813-153734 
 
Bentall, R. P. (1990). The illusion of reality: A review and integration of psychological 
 research on hallucinations. Psychological Bulletin, 107(1), 82-95.  
 doi:10.1037/0033-2909.107.1.82 
Bentall, R. P., & Slade, P. D. (1985). Reliability of a scale measuring disposition towards  
hallucination: A brief report. Personality And Individual Differences, 6(4), 527-
529. doi:10.1016/0191-8869(85)90151-5 
 
Bradley, G. W. (1978). Self-serving biases in the attribution process: A reexamination of  
 the fact or fiction question. Journal Of Personality And Social Psychology, 36(1),  
 56-71. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.36.1.56 
 
Broadbent, D. E., Cooper, P. F., FitzGerald, P. & Parkes, K. R. (1982). The Cognitive 
Failures Questionnaire (CFQ) and its correlates. British Journal of Clinical 






Bruno, N., Sachs, N., Demily, C., Franck, N., & Pacherie, E. (2012). Delusions and  
metacognition in patients with schizophrenia. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 17(1), 
1-18. doi:10.1080/13546805.2011.562071 
 
Buhr, K., & Dugas, M. J. (2002). The intolerance of uncertainty scale: Psychometric  
properties of the english version. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40(8), 931-
945. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(01)00092-4 
 
Chan, C. C., Spencer, C. C., West, C., Viegas, C., & Bedwell, J. S. (2015). Metacognitive  
 processes in psychometrically defined schizotypy. Psychiatry Research,  
 doi:10.1016/j.psychres.2015.09.006 
 
Cicchetti, D., & Rogosch, F. A. (1996). Equifinality and multifinality in developmental  
 psychopathology. Development And Psychopathology, 8(4), 597-600.  
 doi:10.1017/S0954579400007318 
 
Cicero, D. C., Docherty, A. R., Becker, T. M., Martin, E. A., & Kerns, J. G. (2015).  
 Aberrant salience, self-concept clarity, and interview-rated psychotic-like  
 experiences. Journal Of Personality Disorders, 29(1), 79-99.  
 doi:10.1521/pedi_2014_28_150 
 
Cohen, A. S., Matthews, R. A., Najolia, G. M., & Brown, L. A. (2010). Toward a more  
 psychometrically sound brief measure of schizotypal traits: Introducing the SPQ- 
 Brief Revised. Journal Of Personality Disorders, 24(4), 516-537.  
doi:10.1521/pedi.2010.24.4.516 
 
Colbert, S. M., Peters, E., & Garety, P. (2010). Jumping to conclusions and perceptions in  
 early psychosis: Relationship with delusional beliefs. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry,  
 15(4), 422-440. doi:10.1080/13546800903495684 
 
Collett, N., Pugh, K., Waite, F., & Freeman, D. (2016). Negative cognitions about the self  
 in patients with persecutory delusions: An empirical study of self-compassion,  
 self-stigma, schematic beliefs, self-esteem, fear of madness, and suicidal ideation.  
 Psychiatry Research, 23979-84. doi:10.1016/j.psychres.2016.02.043 
 
Das-Smaal, E. A., de Jong, P. F., & Koopmans, J. R. (1993). Working memory,  
attentional regulation and the star counting test. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 14(6), 815-824. doi:10.1016/0191-8869(93)90094-J 
 
Debbané, M., Van der Linden, M., Balanzin, D., Billieux, J., & Eliez, S. (2012).  
 Associations among metacognitive beliefs, anxiety and positive schizotypy during  








Debbané, M., Van der Linden, M., Gex-Fabry, M., & Eliez, S. (2009). Cognitive and  
 emotional associations to positive schizotypy during adolescence. Journal Of  
 Child Psychology And Psychiatry, 50(3), 326-334. doi:10.1111/j.1469- 
 7610.2008.01961.x 
 
Diener, E., Wirtz, D., Tov, W., Kim-Prieto, C., Choi, D., Oishi, S., & Biswas-Diener, R.  
(2010). New well-being measures: Short scales to assess flourishing and positive 
and negative feelings. Social Indicators Research, 97(2), 143-156. 
doi:10.1007/s11205-009-9493-y 
 
Dinzeo, T. J., Thayasivam, U., & Sledjeski, E. M. (2014). The development of the  
Lifestyle and Habits Questionnaire-brief version: Relationship to quality of life 
and stress in college students. Prevention Science, 15(1), 103-114. 
doi:10.1007/s11121-013-0370-1 
 
Ditman, T., & Kuperberg, G. R. (2005). A source-monitoring account of auditory verbal  
hallucinations in patients with schizophrenia. Harvard Review of Psychiatry, 
13(5), 280-299. doi:10.1080/10673220500326391 
 
Ertugrul, A., & Uluğ, B. (2004). Perception of stigma among patients with schizophrenia.  
 Social Psychiatry And Psychiatric Epidemiology, 39(1), 73-77.  
 doi:10.1007/s00127-004-0697-9 
 
Foa, E. B., Huppert, J. D., Leiberg, S., Langner, R., Kichic, R., Hajcak, G., & Salkovskis, 
P. M. (2002). The obsessive-compulsive inventory: Development and validation 
of a short version. Psychological Assessment, 14(4), 485-496. doi:10.1037/1040-
3590.14.4.485 
 
Fonseca-Pedrero, E., Lemos-Giráldez, S., Paino, M., Sierra-Baigrie, S., Villazón-García, 
 Ú., García-Portilla González, M. P., & Muñiz, J. (2010). Dimensionality of 
hallucinatory predisposition: Confirmatory factor analysis of the Launay-Slade 
Hallucination Scale-revised in college students. Anales De Psicología, 26(1), 41-
48. 
 
Freeston, M. H., Rhéaume, J., Letarte, H., Dugas, M. J., & Ladouceur, R. (1994). Why do  
people worry? Personality and Individual Differences, 17(6), 791-802. 
doi:10.1016/0191-8869(94)90048-5 
 
Furco, A., Muller P., & Ammon M.S. ((1998). The Civic Responsibility Survey.  









Goldstone, E., Farhall, J., Thomas, N., & Ong, B. (2013). The role of metacognitive  
 beliefs in the proneness to hallucinations and delusions: An analysis across  
 clinical and non‐clinical populations. British Journal Of Clinical Psychology,  
 52(3), 330-346. doi:10.1111/bjc.12020 
 
Han, M., Huang, X., Chen, D. C., Xiu, M., Kosten, T. R., & Zhang, X. Y. (2013).  
 Diabetes and cognitive deficits in chronic schizophrenia: A case-control study.  
 Plos ONE, 8(6), e66299.  
 
Hekkanen, S. T., & McEvoy, C. (2002). False memories and source-monitoring  
 problems: Criterion differences. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 16(1), 73-85.  
 doi:10.1002/acp.753 
 
Hermann, D. J. & Neisser, U. (1978). An inventory of everyday memory experiences. In  
 Gruneberg, M. M., Morris, P.E. & Sykes, R. N. (Eds), Practical aspects of  
 memory. London: Academic Press. 
 
Howes, O. D., & Kapur, S. (2009). The dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia: Version 
III—The final common pathway. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 35(3), 549-562. 
doi:10.1093/schbul/sbp006 
 
Jaspers, K. (1968). Delusion and awareness of reality. International Journal of  
 Psychiatry, 6(1), 25. 
 
Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Source monitoring.  
 Psychological Bulletin, 114(1), 3-28. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.114.1.3 
 
Joliffe, I. T., & Morgan, B. (1992). Principal component analysis and exploratory factor  
 analysis. Statisical Methods in Medical Research,1, 69-95. doi:  
 10.1177/096228029200100105. 
 
Jolley, S., Ferner, H., Bebbington, P., Garety, P., Dunn, G., Freeman, D., & ... Kuipers, E.  
 (2014). Delusional belief flexibility and informal caregiving relationships in  
 psychosis: A potential cognitive route for the protective effect of social support.  
 Epidemiology And Psychiatric Sciences, 23(4), 389-397.  
 doi:10.1017/S2045796013000553 
 
Jolley, S., Garety, P., Bebbington, P., Dunn, G., Freeman, D., Kuipers, E., & ... Hemsley,  
 D. (2006). Attributional style in psychosis--The role of affect and belief type.  
 Behaviour Research And Therapy, 44(11), 1597-1607.  
 doi:10.1016/j.brat.2005.12.002 
 
Joseph, Z., Victor, K., & Rimona, D. (2011). 'Ego-dystonic' delusions as a predictor of  






Kingdon, D.G., & Turkington, D. (2005). Cognitive Therapy of Schizophrenia. New  
 York: The Guilford Press. 
 
Larøi, F., Collignon, O., & Van der Linden, M. (2005). Source monitoring for actions in 
 hallucination proneness. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 10(2), 105-123.  
doi:10.1080/13546800344000354 
 
Lawn, S., McMillan, J., Comley, Z., Smith, A., & Brayley, J. (2014). Mental health  
 recovery and voting: Why being treated as a citizen matters and how we can do it:  
 Involuntary patients’ right to vote. Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health 
 Nursing, 21(4), 289-295. doi:10.1111/jpm.12109 
 
Lenzenweger, M. F. (2006). Schizotaxia, schizotypy, and schizophrenia: Paul E. meehl's  
 blueprint for the experimental psychopathology and genetics of schizophrenia.  
 Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 115(2), 195-200. doi:10.1037/0021-
 843X.115.2.195. 
 
Liberman, R. P. (2012). Phase-specific recovery from schizophrenia. Psychiatric Annals,  
 42(6),  211-217. doi:10.3928/00485713-20120606-04 
 
Lovibond, S.H. & Lovibond, P.F. (1995).  Manual for the Depression Anxiety Stress  
 Scales. (2nd. Ed.)  Sydney: Psychology Foundation. 
 
Martens, W. J. (2012). Healing dynamics of psychosis. International Forum Of  
 Psychoanalysis, 21(2), 68-81. doi:10.1080/0803706X.2011.592509 
 
McKague, M., McAnally, K. I., Skovron, M., Bendall, S., & Jackson, H. J. (2012).  
 Source monitoring and proneness to auditory-verbal hallucinations: A signal  
 detection analysis. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 17(6), 544-562.  
 doi:10.1080/13546805.2012.676311 
 
Maher, B. A. (1992). Delusions: Contemporary etiological hypotheses. Psychiatric  
 Annals, 22(5), 260-268. 
 
Meehl, P. E. (1990). Toward an integrated theory of schizotaxia, schizotypy, and 
 schizophrenia. Journal of Personality Disorders, 4(1), 1-99. 
 doi:10.1521/pedi.1990.4.1.1 
 
Moritz, S., & Woodward, T. S. (2006). The contribution of metamemory deficits to  
schizophrenia. Journal Of Abnormal Psychology, 115(1), 15-25. 
doi:10.1037/0021-843X.15.1.15 
 
Nunn, J. A., Rizza, F., & Peters, E. R. (2001). The incidence of schizotypy among  
 cannabis and alcohol users. Journal Of Nervous And Mental Disease, 189(11),  





Onwumere, J., Learmonth, S., & Kuipers, E. (2016). Caring for a relative with delusional  
 beliefs: A qualitative exploration. Journal Of Psychiatric And Mental Health  
 Nursing, doi:10.1111/jpm.12291). 
 
Pedersen, M. S., Benros, M. E., Agerbo, E., Børglum, A. D., & Mortensen, P. B. (2012).  
 Schizophrenia in patients with atopic disorders with particular emphasis on  
 asthma: A Danish population-based study. Schizophrenia Research, 138(1), 58- 
 62. doi:10.1016/j.schres.2012.02.019 
 




Perona‐Garcelán, S., García‐Montes, J. M., Ductor‐Recuerda, M. J., Vallina‐Fernández,  
 O., Cuevas‐Yust, C., Pérez‐Álvarez, M., & ... Gómez‐Gómez, M. T. (2012).  
 Relationship of metacognition, absorption, and depersonalization in patients with  
 auditory hallucinations. British Journal Of Clinical Psychology, 51(1), 100-118.  
 doi:10.1111/j.2044-8260.2011.02015.x 
 
Peters, E. R., Joseph, S. A., & Garety, P. A. (1999). Measurement of delusional ideation 
in the  normal population: Introducing the PDI (Peters et al. Delusions 
Inventory). Schizophrenia Bulletin, 25(3), 553-576. 
 
Peters, E., Joseph, S., Day, S., & Garety, P. (2004). Measuring delusional ideation: The  
 21-item peters et al. delusions inventory (PDI). Schizophrenia Bulletin, 30(4),  
 1005-1022. doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.schbul.a007116 
 
Peters, E. R., Moritz, S., Schwannauer, M., Wiseman, Z., Greenwood, K. E., Scott, J.. .  
Garety, P. A. (2014). Cognitive biases questionnaire for psychosis. Schizophrenia 
Bulletin, 40(2), 300-313. doi:10.1093/schbul/sbs199 
 
Reason, J. T. & Mycielska, K. (1982). Absent-minded? The psychology of mental lapses  
 and everyday errors. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc.  
 
Roberts, G. (1991). Delusional belief systems and meaning in life: A preferred reality?.  
 The British Journal Of Psychiatry, 159(Suppl 14), 19-28. 
 
Roberts, G. (1992). The origins of delusion. The British Journal of Psychiatry : The  
 Journal of Mental Science, 161, 298. 
 
Roese, N. J., & Olson, J. M. (2007). Better, stronger, faster: Self-serving judgement,  
 affect regulation, and the optimal vigilance hypothesis. Perspectives On  







Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of  
 reinforcement. Psychological Monographs: General And Applied, 80(1), 1-28.  
 doi:10.1037/h0092976 
 
Saha, S., Scott, J., Varghese, D., & McGrath, J. (2012). Social support and delusional- 
 like experiences: A nationwide population-based study. Epidemiology And  
 Psychiatric Sciences, 21(2), 203-212. doi:10.1017/S2045796011000862 
 
Saxena, S. (2006). A cross-cultural study of spirituality, religion, and personal beliefs as  
 components of quality of life. Social Science & Medicine, 62(6), 1486-1497.  
 doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2005.08.001 
 
Schraw, G. (1998). Promoting general metacognitive awareness. Instructional Science,  
 26(1-2), 113-125. doi:10.1023/A:1003044231033 
 
Shen, C., Sambamoorthi, U., & Rust, G. (2008). Co-occurring mental illness and health  
 care utilization and expenditures in adults with obesity and chronic physical  
 illness. Disease Management, 11(3), 153-160. doi:10.1089/dis.2007.0012 
 
Slavich, G. M. (2015). Understanding inflammation, its regulation, and relevance for  
 health: A top scientific and public priority. Brain, Behavior, And Immunity, 4513- 
 14. doi:10.1016/j.bbi.2014.10.012 
 
Smith, L., Riley, S., & Peters, E. R. (2009). Schizotypy, delusional ideation and well- 
 being in an American new religious movement population. Clinical Psychology &  
 Psychotherapy, 16(6), 479-484. doi:10.1002/cpp.645 
 
Sobin, C., Blundell, M. L., Weiller, F., Gavigan, C., Haiman, C., & Karayiorgou, M.  
 (2000). Evidence of schizotypy subtype in OCD. Journal Of Psychiatric 
 Research, 34(1), 15-24. doi:10.1016/S0022-3956(99)00023-0 
 
Stainsby, L. M., & Lovell, G. P. (2014). Proneness to hallucinations and delusions in a  
 non‐clinical sample: Exploring associations with metacognition and negative  
 affect.  Australian Journal Of Psychology, 66(1), 1-7. doi:10.1111/ajpy.12028 
 
Stanford Patient Education Research Center, Stanford University School of Medicine. 
 Sample Questionnaire: Diabetes. Retrieved from  
 http://patienteducation.stanford.edu/research/diabquest.pdf 
 
Sundag, J., Lincoln, T. M., Hartmann, M. M., & Moritz, S. (2015). Is the content of  
 persecutory delusions relevant to self-esteem?. Psychosis: Psychological, Social  
 And Integrative Approaches, 7(3), 237-248. doi:10.1080/17522439.2014.947616 
 
Tabachnick, T.G., & Fidell, L.D. (2007). Multivariate statistics (5th ed.). Boston, MA:  





Tavakol, M., & Dennick, R. (2011). Making sense of cronbach's alpha. International  
 Journal of Medical Education, 2, 53-55. doi:10.5116/ijme.4dfb.8dfd 
 
Vancampfort, D., De Hert, M., Sweers, K., De Herdt, A., Detraux, J., & Probst, M.  
 (2013). Diabetes, physical activity participation and exercise capacity in patients  
 with schizophrenia. Psychiatry And Clinical Neurosciences, 67(6), 451-456.  
 doi:10.1111/pcn.12077 
 
Verdoux, H., & van Os, J. (2002). Psychotic symptoms in non-clinical populations and  
 the continuum of psychosis. Schizophrenia Research, 54(1-2), 59-65.  
 doi:10.1016/S0920-9964(01)00352-8 
 
Wang, J., Hu, M., Guo, X., Wu, R., Li, L., & Zhao, J. (2013). Cognitive effects of  
 atypical antipsychotic drugs in first episode drug-naïve schizophrenic patients.  
 Neural Regeneration Research, 8(3), 277–286. http://doi.org/10.3969/j.issn.1673- 
5374.2013.03.011 
 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief 
measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 54(6), 1063-1070. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.54.6.1063 
 
Wells, A., & Cartwright-Hatton, S. (2004). A short form of the metacognitions  
 questionnaire: Properties of the MCQ-30. Behaviour Research And Therapy,  
 42(4), 385-396. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(03)00147-5 
 
Woodward, T. S., & Menon, M. (2011). Considerations for analysis of source monitoring  
 data when investigating hallucinations in schizophrenia research. European  
 Archives Of Psychiatry And Clinical Neuroscience, 261(3), 157-164.  
 doi:10.1007/s00406-010-0151-9 
 
Woodward, T. S., Menon, M., & Whitman, J. C. (2007). Source monitoring biases and  
 auditory hallucinations. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 12(6), 477-494.  
 doi:10.1080/13546800701307198 
 
